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Comment:
Seductions of Modern Culture
Angela P. Harris*
In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor explores the stories about
"identity" that frame both our fictions and our philosophy.' In his
view, modern culture is engaged in a long series of disputes between
two different sets of stories about selves. There is the self as a free,
disengaged subject, an autonomous, rational individual capable of
knowing itself and mastering the universe without the intercession of
God, a being that desires liberty above all else; and there is the
"expressivist" self, committed to the truth of inward emotion and
intuition, finding depth and meaning in nature and in the epiphanies
produced by great art.2 In a complex historical account, Taylor
locates the source of these two different kinds of stories in "the great
intramural debate of the last two centuries, pitting the philosophy of
the Enlightenment against the various forms of Romantic op-
position."3
These two different traditions shape not only the stories we tell
about our individual identities, but also the stories we tell about
collective identities: the stories that take the form of histories.
Benedict Anderson, looking for the source of modern nationalism and
its power over people across the globe, describes the nation as an
* Professor, University of California-Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). I would like to
thank Ellen Pader, for listening to me talk this essay through and giving me an anthropological
perspective. All mistakes, of course, remain mine.
1. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
(1989).
2. Taylor describes contemporary, "modem" culture as engaged in a long series of disputes
"between what appear to be the demands of reason and disengaged freedom, and equality and
universality, on one hand, and the demands of nature, or fulfillment, or expressive integrity, or
intimacy, or particularity, on the other." Id. at 101.
3. Id.
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"imagined community."4  A nation is a story, made technically
imaginable through the material transformations that capitalism and
colonialism have wrought around the globe, but receiving its
emotional power from the way it brings the Enlightenment and
Romantic understandings together in a compelling way. A nation is
made up of bearers of individual rights who consent to come together
and be represented by a government. But the modern nation that
thus symbolizes liberty and consent also represents a "people," drawn
together out of an immemorial past and moving into a limitless future,
guided by their common destiny that is precious precisely because it
is fortuitous-unwilled and unchosen but uniquely their own.5
In Bowers v. Hardwick,6 Justice White, writing the opinion of the
Court, tells such a story about America as a nation. Indeed, White's
opinion can be seen as the formulation of an "official nationalism"-a
nationalism promoted by the state that represses alternative stories
among its citizenry for the purpose of maintaining the power of
current elites.7 His opinion draws skillfully on both the Enlighten-
ment vision of the nation as a social contract and the Romantic vision
of the nation as a people to tell a story that makes gays and lesbians
national and constitutional outsiders!
White roots the constitutional protection of fundamental rights both
in the necessity to protect the people's liberty through limitation on
governmental (and particularly judicial) power, and in respect for
America's unique history and traditions as a nation:
Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not
readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more
than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the
States and the Federal Government, the Court has sought to
4. Benedict Anderson, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991).
5. As Anderson puts it:
With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part composed did not
disappear. What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into
continuity, contingency into meaning. As we shall see, few things are better suited to this
end than an idea of nation. If nation-states are widely conceded to be "new" and
"historical," the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an
immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future. It is the magic of
nationalism to turn chance into destiny.
id. at 11-12.
6. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
7. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 101 (defining official nationalism as "an anticipatory
strategy adopted by dominant groups which are threatened with marginalization or exclusion
from an emerging nationally-imagined community"). Elsewhere, Anderson refers to official
nationalism as "a means... for stretching the short, tight skin of the nation over the gigantic
body of the empire." Id. at 86.
8. For a similar conclusion, see KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 201-10 (1989); see also id. at 204 ("The Supreme Court
has placed the stamp of legitimacy on Georgia's official exclusion of gays and lesbians from full
membership in the community.").
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identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial
protection. In Palko v. Connecticut, it was said that this category
include those fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [they] were sacrificed." A different description of
fundamental liberties appeared in Moore v. East Cleveland,
where they are characterized as those liberties that are "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts
of consensual sodomy. Proscriptions against that conduct have
ancient roots.... Sodomy was a criminal offense at common
law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen
states when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but five of the thirty-
seven States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact,
until 1961, all fifty States outlawed sodomy, and today, twenty-
four states and the District of Columbia continue to provide
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and
between consenting adults. . . . Against this background, to
claim that a right to engage in such conduct is "deeply rooted
in this nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" is, at best, facetious. 9
In this Symposium, Robert Morris and Francisco Valdes challenge
White's official nationalism."0 They do so by telling counter-
histories: histories that make the inclusion of gays and lesbians in the
American nation imperative, a matter of justice, rather than
"facetious." Morris directly takes on the official nationalism of
Bowers. Against the Court's attempt to identify "this nation's history
and tradition" solely with the history and tradition of the European
immigrants who constituted the original thirteen colonies, Morris
reminds us that the nation known as America includes the Hawaiian
people. Indeed, Morris points out that acknowledgment of and
respect for the history and traditions of native Hawaiian people is
embedded in United States law: the "Hawaiiana Clauses" of the state
9. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-94 (citations and footnotes omitted).
10. Anderson's case studies of official nationalism indicate that its purpose is usually to
conceal the discrepancy between "nation" and "state": to conceal the existence of multiple
nations living within the bounds of a single state.
In almost every case, official nationalism concealed a discrepancy between nation and
dynastic realm. Hence a world-wide contradiction: Slovaks were to be Magyarized, Indians
Anglicized, and Koreans Japanified, but they would not be permitted to join pilgrimages
which would allow them to administer Magyars, Englishmen, or Japanese. The banquet to
which they were invited always turned out to be a Barmecide feast.
ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 110.
1996]
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of Hawai'i. Morris argues that "our American 'traditions and
collective conscience,"' therefore, includes not only the traditions of
Puritans, Greeks, and Romans, but also the traditions of indigenous
Hawaiians." More specifically, Morris argues that the aikane
relationships among native Hawaiian people both before and after the
invasion of Captain Cook provide an appealing model for the
rearticulation and legalization of contemporary same-sex marriage, in
Hawai'i and possibly elsewhere. 2
Francisco Valdes presents a more indirect, but ultimately more
sweeping, challenge to Justice White's narrative of the American
nation. Where Justice White views the homophobia of our national
culture as a precious heritage to be preserved, Valdes sees it as a
threat to the nation's highest Enlightenment ideals of equality,
autonomy, and liberty. Valdes' counter-history tells the story of
"Euro-American hetero-patriarchy": the sex/gender system con-
temporary Americans imagine to be immutable and universal (fixed
either by human biology or by the Word of God). Focusing on those
ancestors Western Civilization most likes to claim-the ancient
Greeks-and then examining the influence of Judeo-Christian
ideology, Valdes shows that our current sex/gender system is
historically, not biologically or divinely, constructed. Valdes'
historical survey is meant not only to show that the transformation of
our sex/gender system is possible, but that it is necessary in the name
of "the vaunted ideals of equality and liberty that this nation purports
to embrace and uphold."' 3 Where Morris draws on the Romantic
sources of White's official nationalism to argue that "our nation's"
traditions are not what the Court claims they are, then, Valdes draws
on its Enlightenment sources to argue that those traditions can and
should be altered.
Both Morris and Valdes reject the official nationalism of Bowers on
behalf of sexual minorities, but they refuse to do so as
"homosexuals"-the identity constructed for them within modern
culture and maintained in Justice White's narrative. "The
homosexual," as James Baldwin has argued, exists within the
dominant American narrative as a fantasy object, a screen upon which
"heterosexuals" throw their unadmitted fears and desires. 4 Seeking
11. Robert J. Morris, Configuring the Bo(u)nds of Marriage: The Implications of Hawaiian
Culture & Values for the Debate About Homogarmy, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 105, 107, 111
(1996).
12. Id. at 111-12.
13. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender,
and Sexual Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 204-05 (1996).
14. See Richard Goldstein, "Go the Way Your Blood Beats": An Interview with James
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"equality" as homosexuals-as the shadowy mirror image of
heterosexuals-would only perpetuate hetero-patriarchy, the system
of power that keeps both "women" and "homosexuals" "in their
place."15 Indeed, Morris and Valdes write primarily not on behalf
of a group at all, but rather on behalf of a value. For Morris, that
value is "love"; for Valdes, it is "desire." Morris shows that
traditional Hawaiian families were created primarily by love, not
blood, and that the government itself was infused with "aloha spirit."
In his view, respect for this "political economy of love" requires that
Hawai'i grant same-sex marriages legal recognition.1 6 Valdes seeks
to secure "legal recognition and protection of human desire for
intimacy and affection, independent of [instrumentality]," 7 and
speaks of "a reconsideration of the constitutional worth of eros."18
Both Morris and Valdes want to bring law to the defense of love and
desire: to turn law from a protector of the status quo into an "engine"
of social change.1 9
Morris and Valdes, therefore, do not seek legal rights within the
existing sex/gender system, but rather transformation of the system
altogether. And, appropriately, both authors make alliances across
traditional boundaries of social classification. Morris allies gays and
lesbians with native Hawaiians, hoping that "modern homogamy
modeled on the original Hawaiian standard may do two things at
once: ... fit well within the statutory structure of marriage, and...
redefine the power dynamics within a marriage as well as within the
I know from my own experience that the macho men-truck drivers, cops, football
players-these people are far more complex than they want to realize. That's why I call
them infantile. They have needs which, for them, are literally inexpressible. They don't
dare look into the mirror. And that is why they need faggots. They've created faggots in
order to act out a sexual fantasy on the body of another man and not take any respon-
sibility for it. Do you see what I mean? I think it's very important for the male homosexual
to realize that he is a sexual target for other men, and that is why he is despised, and why
he is called a faggot. He is called a faggot because other males need him.
Id. at 42.
15. Thus, Valdes' decision to use the word "queer" rather than "homosexual" is significant.
Rather than "homosexuals," Valdes uses the broader term "sexual minorities" to designate those
people who transgress the cultural rules of sex, sexual orientation, and gender. Valdes, supra
note 133, at 163 n.8. When speaking of political mobilization, Valdes again rejects the term
"homosexual" in favor of the word "queer," which for him signifies a conscious commitment to
dismantling hetero-patriarchy. Id. at 164 n.10. Valdes has elsewhere explicated the concept of
queerness as a political identification at some length. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies,
Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual
Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Culture, 83 CAL L. REV. 1, 346-50 (1995).
16. Morris, supra note 11, at 119.
17. Valdes, supra note 13, at 209.
18. Id.
19. See Morris, supra note 11, at 121 (describing Hawaiiana Clauses as "primary and massive
engines for social change"); Valdes, supra note 13, at 163 (arguing knowledge of historical
construction of hetero-patriarchy may help "change law from an instrument of sex/gender
oppression to an engine for sex/gender liberation").
1996]
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larger family, in the Hawaiian sense."'  Valdes urges coalition
building between feminists and queers: "Simply put, Feminist and
Queer critiques of law and society share common interests because
conflationary hetero-patriarchy... works for the joint subjugation of
women and sexual minorities., 21
This refusal to seek "equality" as defined by hetero-patriarchy is
significant; it would have been easy to insist that the rights of
homosexuals be equal to the rights of heterosexuals and thus be
pulled into the long debate about "sameness" and "difference" that
has long trapped liberal feminists. To refuse this lure of "equality"
as defined by hetero-patriarchy is an important-and subver-
sive-move. Nonetheless, both Morris and Valdes are seduced in a
different way by the traditions that Justice White's official nationalism
draws on so effectively. Some degree of seduction, of course, is
necessary if change is going to occur at all. Lawyers must use the
legal language they have, and even revolutionaries cannot hope to
somehow step outside their cultures.22 Morris and Valdes, as social
critics, must walk a fine line, undermining the very traditions they
draw upon. But by seemingly failing to notice some of the limitations
of the language of modern culture, Morris and Valdes run the risk of
stumbling over them themselves. In Morris' case, it is the traditional
Western arrogance toward the Other that emerges from between the
lines of his text to threaten his argument. In Valdes' case, an
Enlightenment faith in the Western subject's power to perceive and
to remake itself leads to an unwarranted optimism about social
change.
II
Whereas Valdes accepts "Euro-American hetero-patriarchy" as
"our" system, but argues that we should reform it, Morris refuses to
claim it in the first place. To Morris, Hawaiian culture should be
central to an understanding of "our" culture. Morris admits that
native Hawaiian "law, custom, usage, language, and tradition .... do
not derive their authority or lineage from Greek, Roman, Judeo-
Christian, European norms, or Puritan ethics."'  But in his view,
native Hawaiian practices have a stronger claim to being part of "our"
tradition than do the practices of these traditionally "Western"
cultures: "The nations from which those norms and ethics came are
not a geographical, juridical, or political part of the United States,
20. Morris, supra note 11, at 156.
21. Valdes, supra note 13, at 211.
22. For a thoughtful discussion of this point, see BRIAN FAY, CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE:
LIBERATION AND ITS LIMITS 159-64 (1987).
23. Morris, supra note 11, at 107.
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while Hawai'i is." 24  And Hawaiian history shows that
"homosexuality and homosexual relations between persons (aikane)
were not marginalized or denigrated in Hawai'i."'  Rather,
"homosexual relationships were political, egalitarian, chiefly, and
usual., ,26
Morris' narrow goal is to contest the Hawai'i Supreme Court's
treatment of the privacy argument in Baehr v. Lewin,27 the same-sex
marriage case currently on remand from the Hawai'i Supreme Court
for a determination of whether any compelling state interest exists
sufficient to deny same-sex couples a marriage license.' For Morris,
the Hawaiiana Clauses require that same-sex marriage be permitted
in the state of Hawai'i, and perhaps, through analogy and comity, in
other jurisdictions as well.29 More broadly, Morris seeks to under-
mine the official nationalism of Bowers v. Hardwick. Although the
Baehr court never cited Bowers in its opinion, it relied upon the
Bowers "traditions and collective conscience" test of privacy in
rejecting privacy as a ground for legalizing same-sex marriage.30 By
bringing native Hawaiian traditions to the center of "our" traditions
and collective conscience-thus rewriting Bowers-Morris hopes to
provide a "stronger and independent foundation for the analysis and
expansion of Baehr."31  Morris hopes that the study of native
Hawaiian customs and values will contribute to a legal and social
approach to marriage that would focus on "how families are formed
and how they function," not on "petty and unresolvable inquiries into
whether 'homosexuality' is or is not 'immutable,' or whether
'homosexuals' are or are not a 'suspect class."' 32 Most broadly,
Morris argues that the Hawaiiana Clauses "provide, or ought to
provide, both the strategic and rhetorical critique that makes possible
our rational thought about homogamy."33 "If we will let it," Morris
says, "the Hawaiian value system can lead us out of the heterosexist
morass of modern culture."34
Morris' challenge to Justice White's official nationalism is exciting
in its insistence that indigenous peoples be taken seriously as part of
24. Id.
25. Id. at 111.
26. Id.
27. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
28. Morris, supra note 11, at 106.
29. Id at 109-10.
30. Id. at 110 n.21 (citing Christopher Keller, Divining the Priest: A Case Comment on Baehr
v. Lewin, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 483 (1994)).
31. Id. at 109.
32. I& at 159.
33. Id. at 121.
34. Id. at 111.
1996]
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the nation's "We the People." But the history he tells to support his
challenge involves several problems of cultural translation between
premodern Hawai'i and contemporary America that he either fails to
acknowledge or dismisses as trivial. As Eric Cheyfitz has noted,
American imperialism "historically has functioned (and continues to
function) by substituting for the difficult politics of translation another
politics of translation that represses these difficulties," a repression
accomplished through both textual and literal violence.35 Morris'
failure to give us a history that takes the politics of translation
seriously, and his repression of the complexity and subtlety of the
problems involved, threatens to do violence to his otherwise laudable
goals.
Even before these problems of translation are addressed, we might
ask whether Morris' legal argument accomplishes what he thinks it
does. Morris believes that he can destroy the power of Bowers'
official nationalism if he can show that the Court erred in footnote 6
of its opinion when it included Hawai'i in the list of 32 states that had
criminal sodomy laws in 1868, the year the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified. To this end, Morris shows that Hawai'i at the time had
recently gone through several legal and political regimes (some of
dubious legitimacy), so that the law in force was unclear; that
Hawaiian prosecutions for sodomy were few and far between; and
that understanding the law in force requires an understanding not
only of its English but its Hawaiian text, since Hawaiian was and is an
official language of the state of Hawaii. But this critique, though
persuasive, does not alter the legal force of Justice White's history.
Justice White's point was not that all states had criminal sodomy laws
in 1868. Unanimity is not necessary to find that there was a national
"tradition" of criminalizing sodomy; even a mere two-thirds majority,
presumably, would still be evidence of a tradition. Thus, it is hard to
see how the Court's erroneous characterization of Hawaiian law
caused it to "unwittingly incorporate a body of law and language that
is very nearly the antithesis of its holding-a body of law that largely
deconstructs the premises upon which that holding is based.
' 6
Morris' leaps between the American national tradition and the
tradition(s) of the state of Hawai'i, between excoriating the Bowers
Court and exhorting the Baehr court, are often confusing.
These problems aside, however, there remain the questions of
translation. Morris' tools for allying contemporary same-sex marriage
with traditional Hawaiian culture are what he calls the "Hawaiiana
35. ERIC CHEYFrz, THE POETICS OF IMPERIALISM: TRANSLATION AND COLONIZATION
FROM THE TEMPEST TO TARZAN, at xvi (1991).
36. Morris, supra note 11, at 123.
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Clauses," a cluster of Hawai'i state constitutional and statutory texts.
Morris writes:
The Hawaiiana Clauses require the cessation of all prohibitions
against homogamy both because they are now part and parcel of
our American "traditions and collective conscience," and also
because the Clauses, themselves, view such equality as inherent
among human individuals. The Hawaiiana Clauses suggest that
if the "traditions and collective conscience" standard is to be
used, it must not be used selectively on the side of homophobia.
Because privacy is context- and tradition-sensitive, the Clauses
require a leap back over time, back over all of the nineteenth
century, over the first written statutes and constitutions, over the
advent of the Calvinist missionaries and all other non-Hawaiians,
to 1778, a pre-literate point when Hawai'i was pure Hawai'i.
In order to get to this point, we must conduct a far-ranging and
multifarious "inquest on the past., 37
An "inquest" is a legal investigation typically performed on the
occasion of a death: presumably, in this case, the death of the past.
But three problems of translation emerge upon the undertaking of
this inquest. First, how can we be certain about our translation of the
practices of aikdne across the lines of power as well as language that
separated European traders and missionaries from the indigenous
people of Hawai'i in the eighteenth century? Second, how can we
reliably translate these practices from their own context to that of the
present? And third, is there something in this process of translation
that assumes not just the disappearance of the past, but of the
Hawaiians themselves?
To what extent can we understand how aikane lived and loved one
another-what they meant to one another? This question is particular-
ly acute if, as he says, Morris seeks a "pure" Hawai'i, an oral culture
untouched by European hands; and his own evidence frequently
undermines the clarity and certainty of the story he tells. Morris
insists that the relationship between aikdne was egalit-
arian-3 8 --although he also argues that a standard feature of such
relationships was that "a person is rescued from filth and degradation,
or raised in social status. '39 He tells us that there were both male
and female aikdne-although his stories are exclusively about men.
He tells us that traditional Hawaiian culture had no systems of sexual
hierarchy, whether based on gender or on dichotomies like active-
passive and dominant-recessive-"whatever other seeming similarities
37. Id. at 111.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 145.
19961
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the aikane relationships may have to these other institutions [rep-
resenting homogamy in other cultures]."'  Yet, the density of his
discussion about the social rankings generated by the terms kapu and
noa raises questions about their possible influence on intimate
relationships.41 Finally, he tells us that the relationship between
aikane was (homo)sexual, although some of the sources he cites
indicate a debate over that question.42
Morris initially acknowledges the problems of sources and
interpretation,43 only later to brush them aside. Yet, particularly
when dealing with an oral culture, these problems can be acute. As
Arnold Krupat notes of Native American literature, to produce a
"text" about an oral culture that can then be mined for information
requires the work of both transcribers and translators.' At each of
these points-transcription and translation-there may be errors,
misunderstandings, slippages; and these problems, universal to all acts
of translation, become much more serious when the encounter
between two different languages and two different modes of cultural
reproduction is also an encounter between colonizer and colonized.45
Morris is explicit about the efforts of Western missionaries to
destroy native Hawaiian culture in the name of "civilization" and
Christianity, and about Hawaiian resistance:
[Ilt was the "kinship network," the "relations," that many mis-
sionaries realized was the stumbling block to "submissive wifely
behavior." They believed that "true family feeling" did not exist
among the Hawaiians, and that the Hawaiian kin system was
"predatory." Hence, they turned their attention to the political
and economic structures of Hawaiian society, including those
40. Id. at 155.
41. See id. at 152-54.
42. See id. at 127-28. Morris also notes the complexity of this issue in his discussion of
whether aikane committed "sodomy." Id. at 129.
43. See id. at 127-28.
44. See ARNOLD KRUPAT, ETHNOCRITICISM: ETHNOGRAPHY, HISTORY, LITERATURE 176
(1992).
45. Gyan Prakash illustrates the problem with reading archival documents on the abolition
of sai, the Hindu widow sacrifice in the early nineteenth century:
The historian encounters these records ... as evidence of the contests between the British
"civilizing mission" and Hindu heathenism, between modernity and tradition, and as a story
of the beginning of the emancipation of Hindu women and about the birth of modem
India. This is so because ... the very existence of these documents has a history that
entails the use of women as the site for both the colonial and the indigenous male elite's
constructions of authoritative Hindu traditions. The questions asked of accumulated
sources on sati-whether or not the burning of widows was sanctioned by Hindu codes, did
women go willingly to the funeral pyre, on what grounds could the immolation of women
be abolished---come to us marked by their early nineteenth-century history. The historian's
confrontation today with sources on sati, therefore, cannot escape the echo of that previous
rendezvous.
Gyan Prakash, AHR Forunv Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism, 99 AM. HIST. REV.
1475, 1487 (1994).
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related to land, which they believed undermined the fundamental
reforms they were sent to effect. 6
To the missionaries, Hawaiian kinship relations and relations to
"property" were wrong, "improper," insufficiently civilized, and
insufficiently "manly"-and in need of drastic alteration.4 7 In par-
ticular, the missionaries devoted themselves to making Hawaiian kin
relationships "proper" by imposing the concept of Christian marriage
upon Hawaiians.as The Hawaiians were aware of this, and there is
some evidence that they responded by concealing their actions and
beliefs from the haoles.4
9
. Yet Morris does not take the next step of wondering how the
missionaries' assumption of European superiority, with its distaste
for-if not horror of-the Hawaiian way of life might have pervaded
the very documents we now rely on for knowledge of traditional
aikane lives. Morris concedes that there were massive problems for
the missionaries, not only in trying to translate the concept of
"sodomy" as a sin, but in trying to translate the concept of "marriage"
itself.5 ° He approvingly cites Maivdn Clech Lam, who describes "a
bad fit between Western and Hawaiian concepts, a certain 'linguistic
noncalibration,' ambivalence, and uncertainty."51 But Morris does
not address to what extent our own understanding of aikdne may be
altered by this ambivalence, uncertainty, and possibly outright
distortion. He treats the attempt to trace a history of sodomy
prosecutions as hopelessly tainted by its documentation by the
colonizers, but not so our own attempt at tracing aikane relationships.
Even assuming that we have access to the meaning of aikane as it
existed in "pure Hawai'i," the problems of translation continue when
we try to translate that complex set of social practices to the present-
day state of Hawai'i. Morris himself gives an indication of the
problems of translating "fundamental" (to Enlightenment subjects)
constitutional concepts such as "due process" and "equal protection"
into Hawaiian: He notes that not only is there a considerable gap
between the English and the Hawaiian, but that Hawaiian translations
differ dramatically from one another.52 Eric Cheyfitz analyzes a
similar problem from the Native American context-translating the
seemingly simple concept "sale of property.":
46. Morris, supra note 11, at 156 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 125.
48. Id. at 156.
49. Id. at 130.
50. Id. at 129-30.
51. Id. at 123 (citing Maivan Clech LAm, The Kuleana Act Revisited: The Survival of
Traditional Hawaiian Common Rights in Land, 64 WASH. L. REV. 233 (1989)).
52. Id. at 141-43.
1996] 223
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We can only talk about the sale of property [between the English
and Indians in the United States colonial period] if, like the
deeds themselves, we talk about these cases exclusively in English
terms. For from the Indians' perspective there was in the first
place no place to translate (to use the legal terminology from
Blackstone). That is, the land that the Indians negotiated to
share with the English was in Algonquian, or kin-ordered, terms
not alienable in individualized places that could be traded in a
market economy. The Indians' land, then, was unfenced, which
is not to say that it wasn't marked or bounded, that is, placed,
but only to say that from the contemporary Western perspec-
tive... these boundaries were "open" and "shifting," and from
the perspective of the English colonists they were virtually
invisible or untranslatable.. . . The problem here, it seems to me,
is not the translation of the reasonable into the "arbitrary" (or
vice versa); the notion that English ideas of place were arbitrary
or "abstract". . . in contrast to Indian conceptions risks placing
the Indians back in the natural world as noble savages (all
naming is arbitrary or abstract, that is, cultural, when one thinks
of it in terms of some unmediated natural realm). Rather, the
problem is how does one translate ideas of place grounded in
conceptions of communal or social labor into ideas of place
grounded in the notion of identity? The problem is not.., how
does one translate radically different systems of property into one
another. But can one translate the idea of place as property into
an idea of lace the terms of which the West has never granted
legitimacy?
Morris also refers to some problems in translating the concept of
aikane. For example, should aikane translate into "marriage" or some
form of "adoption"? Morris notes that in the nineteenth century
adoption was frequently used as a legal translation of aikane,54 but
an aikdne might also be considered an "unranked brother,"
introducing an "ethic of siblingship."" Morris says that "as part of
the extended family, an aikdne might be interchangeably designated
as a relative."56  Yet Morris refers to aikdne in the nineteenth-
century probate case Estate of Kami'i simply as "homogamous
lovers."57  Might not a more appropriate goal than homogamy
simpliciter be some hybrid legal form that incorporated conceptions
of "ramage" or ma-a new legal form that would allow friends as well
53. CHEYFrrZ, supra note 35, at 57-58.
54. Morris, supra note 11, at 135, 146.
55. Id. at 135. Perhaps the best way to think about an aikane relationship is as adoption and
marriage combined.
56. Id. at 136.
57. Id.
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as lovers, groups of three or more as well as couples, to be come legal
family? The story of 'Umi, which Morris tells us most Hawaiianists
agree is "paradigmatic," shows that 'Umi had at least three aikane.58
Should the laws of bigamy be altered in order to accommodate the
new aikane marriage? Morris also argues that rights of gathering on
land and sea and rights pertaining to administration and government
were tied up with aikane relationships.59 If all of these practices are
a seamless web, shouldn't legalizing the aikane relationship involve
much more than simply granting same-sex couples a marriage license?
Of course, Morris is right that cultures must change with material and
political conditions, and that the aikane relationships of today cannot
be the same as those prior to contact with Europeans. But it is
jarring to see this complex web of relationships involving love,
friendship, kinship, land, sea, and government deftly reduced to
"homogamy." Yet Morris seems confident that despite these
difficulties, the existence of aikane in traditional times not only
permits, but requires modem-day same-sex marriage-nothing less,
and nothing more.
The third problem of translation is the question of indigenous
resistance to translation itself. Morris with approval quotes Anthony
Kronman: "We must respect the past because the world of culture
that we inherit from it makes us who we are."' But whose "we" is
this? Morris defends with vigor and outlines with care his translation
of native Hawaiian practices of aikane, and passionately argues that
the Hawaiiana Clauses require that these practices be accommodated
by present-day law. He emphasizes that "Hawaiian culture finds ways
to re-instantiate itself in modem forms but with traditional (i.e., pre-
1778) values.... Deference paid by lawmakers to Hawaiian values
and traditions honors this method of cultural survival. With respect
to homogamy, true respect for Hawaiian traditions necessitates finding
a legal way for it and heterogamy to co-exist."' But for whose
benefit? Morris notes that under article XII, section 7 of the state
constitution, the Hawaiian customs and rights that must be respected
must not only be somehow tied to the use of the land, but are
"limited to the protection of Hawaiian tradition by and for Hawaiians
only."62  But a statute, Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 1-1,
"protects Hawaiian tradition without limits according to person or
class. Thus, it appears that Hawaiian tradition must be upheld for
58. Id. at 146.
59. Id. at 132.
60. Id. at 157 (quoting Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029,
1066 (1990)).
61. Id. at 141.
62. Id. at 139.
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Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians alike., 63 This statement is not only
doubtful statutory interpretation; it is also troubling politics. Morris'
reading of the Hawaiiana Clauses appears to defend native Hawaiian
culture only to appropriate it for the benefit of non-Hawaiians.
Morris argues that the Baehr court's views of the relationship
between homosexuality and privacy "flies in the face of traditional
Hawaiian usage and the facts of the case."' He argues that if oral
testimony is acceptable to prove native Hawaiian customs and
traditions regarding land use in a particular area, "then testimony
about the practice of homogamous relationships should be acceptable
for the plaintiffs in a homogamy petition." 6' He does not tell us,
however, whether these plaintiffs would or should be native
Hawaiians. Again, Morris' quick dismissal of the possibility that the
Hawaiiana Clauses are specifically for native Hawaiians bespeaks a
willingness to turn translation into appropriation.
Morris never discusses the relationship between the Hawaiiana
Clauses and the present-day Hawaiian people. Indeed, Morris tells
us almost nothing at all about the lives of present-day Hawaiian
people. For example, do aikane still exist today? Sometimes he hints
that aikane relationships end around mid-nineteenth century,66 and
he speaks of them in the past tense.67 Elsewhere, he writes that the
recognition of Hawaiian customs and practices under the Hawaiiana
Clauses requires "the establishment of the practices as of 1778 and
that they have been continued by the Hawaiians," suggesting that the
existence of contemporary aikane relationships is crucial. 68 Finally,
at one point he simply asserts that "aikane persons and relationships
continue to this day, hidden, if at all, because of modern homophobia,
not because their validity or Hawaiianness has died out."69 Yet we
finish the article not knowing any more than these hints and sugges-
tions about how "the Hawaiian people themselves" presently
understand these relationships. Surely this is an important issue if
aikane marriage is to be legally recognized.
There are two points here. One is the question of political
coalition: Morris' argument would be more persuasive if in fact there
were a present-day practice of aikdne among native Hawaiians, and
if native Hawaiians and non-Hawaiian gays and lesbians in Hawai'i
were working together to gain legal recognition of these relationships.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 149.
65. Id. at 150.
66. Id. at 135, 139.
67. Id. at 155.
68. Id. at 148.
69. Id. at 141.
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There is only a suggestion of such a coalition at the end of the
article.7° The second point is suggested by the first: What story does
Morris' argument tell about the relationship between America as a
nation and Hawai'i as a nation?
For the problems of translation here do not involve cultures within
a single nation. Hawai'i did not join the United States by consent; it
was conquered and its people assimilated by force. And this conquest
has not been forgiven and forgotten.71 The contemporary Hawaiian
sovereignty movement constitutes another powerful challenge to
Justice White's official nationalism in Bowers-a denial of the
assumption that "we" are now a single "nation." Yet in accepting
Justice White's challenge to articulate the traditions and collective
conscience of "our Nation," Morris potentially puts himself at odds
with the sovereignty movement and repeats the incorporation of
native Hawaiians into the United States. In Morris' vision, traditions
and customs that belonged to the native Hawaiian nation are to be
taken and transformed for the benefit of the American nation.
Morris does not address the implications of this appropriation for the
Hawaiian sovereignty movement, or for Hawaiian cultural integrity
more generally. Rather the Hawaiian nation becomes the State of
Hawai'i.72
Morris' own language tends to obscure these difficult issues of
assimilation and separatism. Morris argues for a revival of aikane
practices on behalf of equality, not between Hawaiians and non-
Hawaiians, but as "inherent among human individuals."73  In a
lengthy footnote, Morris approvingly cites Christopher Keller's use of
Enlightenment language to describe "God-given 'inalienable rights'
which exist for every person"74 and describes the Hawaiian materials
as having much to say about "the nature of being human."75 This
language of universal humanism is itself culture-bound: It is the
language of the Enlightenment. It is also a language that obscures
questions of power and consent by assuming them away, by soothingly
insisting that we are all just "human beings" and therefore no
problems of translation exist.
70. Id. at 158.
71. A vibrant Hawaiian sovereignty movement exists today, as Morris acknowledges at the
end of the article. Id.
72. For an argument suggesting a very different legal approach to native Hawaiian cultural
practices-that the courts constitute an important site for "cultural performance," and that
native Hawaiians should have access to the courts as native Hawaiians-see Eric Yamamoto,
Courts and the Cultural Performance: Native Hawaiians' Uncertain Right to Sue in Federal and
State Courts, 16 U. HAw. L REV. 1 (1994).
73. Morris, supra note 11, at 111.
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But the problems of translation do exist; one response to them is
indigenous resistance to the very project of translation. Cheyfitz
notes that nineteenth-century Indians resisted translation, and that
this resistance-an insistence on the importance of that which cannot
be translated-has been key to maintaining Indian cultural integrity
in the twentieth century.76 Even when the translation project is no
longer undertaken for the purpose of reforming indigenous culture,
but for reforming our own, there may be problems. "Even if we were
to disavow the attempt to make other societies into our property,
vowing only to get to know them better in order to reform the
institution of property in our own, we would remember, as Levi-
Strauss does, that the history of this knowledge, the history of
anthropology, cannot be separated from the history of the West's
appropriation of these societies."77  Indeed, one of the persistent
manifestations of cultural imperialism for Native Americans in the
twentieth century has been the White craze for all things Indian.78
76. CHEYFITZ, supra note 35, at 137-40.
77. Id. at 52. Arnold Krupat makes a similar point with respect to literary criticism across
cultures (which he calls "ethnocriticism"):
For all that ethnocriticism wishes to engage on an equal footing with Native literary
practice, it cannot help but do so in a context of vastly unequal power relations. Thus, for
all that the ethnocritic may decently and sincerely attempt to inquire into and learn from
the Otherness of ongoing Indian literary performances, the sociopolitical context being
what it is, she or he cannot help but threaten to swallow, submerge, or obliterate these
performances. This is not to say that nothing can be done; but good-will or even great
talent alone cannot undo the current differential power relations between dominant and
subaltern cultural production
KRUPAT, supra note 44, at 186.
78. For an argument that "New Age" attempts to appropriate Indian ceremonies, traditions,
and spiritual concepts constitute a form of attempted cultural genocide, see Ward Churchill, A
Little Matter of Genocide and Spiritual Hucksterism, in FANTASIES OF THE MASTER RACE:
LrrERATURE, CINEMA AND THE COLONIZATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS 187,215 (M. Annette
Jaimes ed., 1992).
Wendy Rose connects the contemporary fad of White poets and spiritualists for presenting
themselves as "shamans" directly to the discipline of anthropology, which has located Indian
culture solely in the past, removed from the lives of present-day Indians and understood best
by White experts. "If, as the academics would have it, Indians 'no longer really know' or at
least lack access to their traditions and spirituality (not to mention land tenure), then it follows
that they are no longer 'truly' Indian. If culture, tradition, spirituality, oral literature, and land
are not theirs to protect, then such things are free for the taking." Wendy Rose, The Great
Pretenders: Further Reflections on Whiteshamanism, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA:
GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 403, 407 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992).
The poet Leslie Marmon Silko sees the project of "reforming" the Indians through destroying
their spiritual world view as involving not only missionary work but the incursion of English
words for things-the possibility of translation itself. In the beginning, she writes, "the people
shared a single clan name."
But the fifth world had become entangled with European names; the names of the rivers,
the hills, the names of the animals and plants-all of creation suddenly had two names: an
Indian name and a white name. Christianity separated the people from themselves; it tried
to crush the single clan name, encouraging each person to stand alone, because Jesus Christ
would save only the individual soul; Jesus Christ was not like the Mother who loved and
cared for them as her children, as her family. .. . The old instinct had always been to
gather the feelings and opinions that were scattered through the village, to gather them like
willow twigs and tie them into a single prayer bundle that would bring peace to all of them.
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Imperialism does not always involve gunboats; it can also wear the
smiling face of universal humanism.7 9 In this context, Morris' failure
to acknowledge the possibility of conflict between native Hawaiians
and Hawai'i state gays and lesbians over the proper interpretation of
the Hawaiiana Clauses is deeply problematic.
Let me be clear. I am not arguing that political coalitions cannot
or should not exist between native Hawaiians and gays and lesbians.
I am not arguing that translation in this context is impossible or
inherently imperialist-that these groups today are as utterly foreign
to one another and burdened by the same relations of power as were
the native Hawaiians and the missionaries in the nineteenth century.
Nor would I argue that because "pure Hawai'i" cannot be recovered,
contemporary law should make no effort to preserve and maintain
those traditions that persist, or that are reinvented for a new
generation. The translation Morris argues for is possible, and perhaps
even "devoutly to be wished."' The problem is that the politics of
translation, in order to be surmounted, must first be openly set forth,
in all their complexity and delicacy; and this Morris has not done.
Part of the difficulty, perhaps, stems from the two hats Morris
wears throughout his article-the historian's and the lawyer's.
American constitutional law assumes one nation, one tradition; it
assumes a world in which there are no meaningful problems of
translation. As a lawyer, Morris correctly marshalls his evidence and
presents it in the most convincing light: eliding uncertainty, ambiguity,
difficulties of translation; assuming one nation and one tradition. Yet
his legal argument gains much of its strength from its reliance upon
history as an ally. And a historian dealing with questions of cultural
difference in a colonial context must strive to acknowledge and to
undermine the very culture-boundedness that makes the lawyer's
argument so persuasive and certain. The historian must, that is, deal
But now the feelings were twisted, tangled roots, and all the names for the source of this
growth were buried under English words, out of reach. And there would be no peace and
the people would have no rest until the entanglement had been unwound to the source.
LESLIE MARMON SILKO, CEREMONY 68-69 (1977), quoted in CHEYFITZ, supra note 35, at 138.
79. Rose connects the White appropriation of Indian customs and practices out of context
explicitly with the rhetoric of universal humanism:
In the construction at hand, those who embrace the Euro-derivation of "universal
knowledge" are considered by definition to be the normative expression of intellectual
advancement among all humanity. They are "citizens of the world," holders of "the big
picture," having inherent rights to impose themselves and their "insights" everywhere and
at all times, with military force if need be. . . . The phenomenon is integral to
Euroamerican culture, transcending all ideological boundaries demarcating conservatism
and progressivism; a poster popular among science fiction readers of both political
persuasions shows a 15th-century European ship sailing a star-map and asks: "What would
have happened if Ferdinand and Isabella had said no?"
Rose, supra note 78, at 407.
80. Morris, supra note 11, at 159.
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seriously with the problems of language, culture, and power that
emerge from the encounter between native Hawaiians and Europeans.
Not to do so is to commit the worst sort of "law-office history."
As Cheyfitz notes, to insist there are no problems of translation is
itself a familiar tactic of imperialism.81 In seeking to minimize these
complex and difficult problems-in letting the lawyer win out over the
historian-Morris is seduced by the official nationalism he sets out to
defeat.
III
Valdes succumbs to a different, and far less dangerous, seduction
of modern culture.' Valdes uses history, not to sketch a tradition
different from our own, but to investigate how our culture came to
take the shape it does. By proving that our sex/gender system is
"socially constructed," he hopes to show that it can and should be
altered to further our nation's Enlightenment ideals. His history is
valuable both as an analysis of "Euro-American hetero-patriarchy"
and as a demonstration of its culture-boundedness. But his un-
questioning faith in our ability (and willingness) to alter our own
culture once we are shown its flaws is subject to question.
Valdes skillfully enlists both Enlightenment and Romantic values
to subvert Euro-American hetero-patriarchy. The more developed
prong of his attack is the one that appeals to Enlightenment values:
rationality as a method and liberty as a goal. Valdes diligently works
to subject the peculiar, unruly, and perfectly queer rules of the
contemporary sex/gender system to rationality. He first disaggregates
"sex," 83  "gender,"'  "sexual orientation, "85 and "sexuality."86
81. See CHEYFrrrz, supra note 35, at 105. Cheyfitz writes:
In the beginning, as preamble to and constitution of the act of dispossession, we find the
activity of colonization as translation, both in the sense of conversion from one language
into another and in a metaphorical or transferred sense. In this case, however, translation
means precisely not to understand others who are the original (inhabitants) or to
understand those others all too easily-as if there were no questions of translation-solely
in terms of one's own language, where those others become a useable fiction: the fiction
of the Other.
Id.
82. Like Morris, Valdes sometimes looks to indigenous cultures as a source for the critique
and reform of our own. In several footnotes, he praises the "Native American" sex/gender
system as superior to Euro-American hetero-patriarchy in many respects. See, e.g., Valdes,
supra note 13, at 204 n.156. By "the Native American sex-gender system," Valdes primarily
means the Zuni practice of berdache, about which he has written elsewhere. See Valdes, supra
note 15, at 209-44. The bulk of this article is, however, not devoted to understanding and
transplanting Zuni or other Native American practices, but rather to exploring the history of
"Western" culture.
83. Sex is defined as "the physical attributes of bodies." Valdes, supra note 13, at 164.
84. Gender is defined as "personality attributes and socio-sexual roles that society
understands to be 'masculine' or 'feminine' and which society ascribes on the basis of sex." Id.
85. Sexual orientation is defined as "the inclination of sexual or affectional interests and
desires among humans, as directed toward members of the same sex, the other sex, or both
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Valdes then literally maps the "conflation" (the term itself subtly
suggesting a rational reality distorted by ideology) of the first three
terms, using a diagram to show how the contemporary American
sex/gender system "constructs sex as the determinant of gender,
conceptualizes gender as the social dimension of sex, and treats sexual
orientation as the sexual performance of gender."'  On the basis of
this conflation, Valdes convincingly argues that "sexual orientation
discrimination" is always already "sex discrimination," and thus
antidiscrimination law will be incomplete until it reaches legal
discrimination against sexual minorities."8 He also persuasively
shows that this very "conflation"-the persistent tendency of these
concepts to slide into one another, to be taken to represent one
another, to mutually reinforce one another-ensures the stability of
the system, by presenting a seamless web of ideology to the subjects
it constructs.
But Valdes seeks to go further-not only to dissect Euro-American
hetero-patriarchy but to dispel any pretense that it is natural, normal,
and necessary. To do so, Valdes analyzes the classical sex/gender
system to show how, despite dissimilarities, it laid the foundation for
our own. Valdes' history of classical Greek sexual culture, and the
Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian cultures that followed it, is a
teleological one, full of "proto" systems that slowly but inexorably
through the centuries lock into place to produce today's sex/gender
system. 9  It is also a functionalist history: Cultural practices,
including sexual ones, emerge, persist, and then dissolve, all in
obedience to their usefulness in holding a society together. This story
does not even try to understand these cultures as the people living in
them did. But Valdes is not interested in these cultures for their own
sake. He is resolutely "present-ist": The point of his history is to talk
about the present, to show that our sex/gender system is not divinely
or biologically required, but was shaped by a particular history and
thus "socially constructed." He hopes that his presentation of the
historical record will provide an "impetus for sex/gender reform."9
sexes." Id at 164-65.
86. Sexuality is defined as "the erotic sensibilities of the person or group being discussed
[when disregarding] the distinction between desire and behavior." Id at 165.
87. Id. at 168.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., id. at 173 ("The march toward institutionalized patriarchy"); id. at 198 ("These
proto-conflationary elements of Greek sex/gender arrangements pointed the way toward the
contemporary conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation."). Charles Taylor tells us that
"[t]ypically modem forms of narrativity include stories of linear development, progress stories
in history .... Rather than seeing life in terms of predefined phases, making a whole whose
shape is understood by unchanging tradition, we tell it as a story of growth toward often
unprecedented ends." TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 105-06.
90. Valdes, supra note 13, at 163.
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This reform involves, apparently, the making of wise "policy" by
social engineers. Valdes recommends, for example, that "it would
behoove law and policy makers, and society more generally, to apply
the lessons that this historical and comparative record offers."'"
Valdes thus energetically uses Enlightenment values against modern
culture itself: He presents himself both as the scientific debunker,
dispelling myths of "Naturality, Normality, and Morality," along with
associated claims of "Necessity" or "Utility,"92 and as the en-
lightened and rational policymaker, ready to institute practical
reforms.
But Valdes supplements his Enlightenment arguments with
unexpectedly Romantic ones. Rather than supporting the abolition
of Euro-American hetero-patriarchy in the name of increased
autonomy, liberty, equality, or efficiency, as one might expect, he
relies on a different value: "desire." The problem that seems to him
foremost is that in the long history of Euro-American hetero-
patriarchy, desire is never valued for its own sake, but solely for the
"instrumental" purposes to which it can be put. It is the very
functionality of the various sex/gender systems throughout Western
history that Valdes finds objectionable; and it is not ultimately liberty
or equality that Valdes wants us to respect, but desire "as such."
Thus, Valdes deplores the way in which Greek sexuality maintained
its social relations: "Greek regulation of social life in general, and
sexual relations in particular, was instrumental because it used sex,
gender, and sexuality to reinforce class-based and sex-based power
distributions.... Sexual desire thus became a commodity used more
for the re-production of the society than for the reproduction of the
species. "' And again, "The Greek system of formalized cross-sex
and same-sex unions thus channeled the sexual desires of its in-
habitants to re-produce its ideology even as it reproduced its
population."'94 "Institutionalized paiderastia, like the institution of the
family in the cross-sex context, thereby marshalled desire to serve the
Greek society's sex/gender ideology."'"
Summing up, Valdes says the historical record underscores how
"[diesire is socially and legally devalued unless it is imbued with the
instrument of ideology."96 He finds a constant theme throughout
history in "the suppression of of sexual desires that do not serve
specific ideological goals."97  Valdes finds this "devaluation of
91. Id. at 209.
92. Id. at 203-04.
93. Id. at 180.
94. Id. at 182.
95. Id. at 188.
96. Id. at 170.
97. Id. at 194.
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desire" intact in modern-day American law, which protects sexuality
only insofar as it serves state goals such as preserving hetero-
patriarchy itself in the institution of marriage.98 Indeed, of all the
cultures Valdes reviews "the Euro-American model is the most
instrumental (and repressive) sex/gender regime."99 Valdes main-
tains that "contemporary law fails to recognize the worth of non-
instrumental desire or intimacy.""° Rather, "the human desire for
erotic contact and intimacy has been exploited for its instrumental
potential in the construction of society and its internal sex/gender
borders.""1 1
This instrumentality is deeply troubling to Valdes, but it is not clear
why. Perhaps Valdes is only attacking the instrumental use of desire
to create and punish certain groups, as Euro-American hetero-
patriarchy creates and punishes "women" and "sexual minorities."
But Valdes' repeated use of the word "instrumental," always a
rhetorical club, suggests that he sees the alliance of desire with
cultural stability as inherently problematic. He argues that "the
failure to recognize desire as intrinsically valuable can be harmful
because it permits dominant forces to assess and govern the desires
of all in self-serving fashion."" Here, Valdes-despite his stance
as rationalist social reformer-seems to argue that there is something
wrong with instrumentality itself. He concludes, "The pending task,
therefore, is securing legal recognition and protection of human desire
for intimacy and affection, independent of social goals as filtered
through dominant sex/gender ideology";1 3 and he calls for "the
revaluation of desire, pleasure, and intimacy as intrinsically important
aspects of human life ....
It is unclear what Valdes means by his call to value desire, pleasure,
and intimacy for their own sake, if this represents an attack on the
use of desire for instrumental purposes altogether. Translated into
legal terms, however, this would seem to require more than simply
extending the protections of anti-discrimination law to sexual
minorities. Would his protection of desire as such mean that sexuality
could never be restrained, no matter what or who might be harmed
in its expression? Would sexuality be protected like the free exercise
of religion-respected except when the majority found it simply too
incomprehensible or dangerous?
98. Id. at 170-72.
99. Id. at 207.
100. Id. at 172.
101. Id. at 206.
102. Id. at 172.
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Valdes identifies gender as the linchpin for the joint oppression of
women and sexual minorities.1 5 Perhaps he would join with Bob
Connell in imagining the Romantic as well as Enlightenment benefits
of a genderless world:
First there are more players in the game. The "equal oppor-
tunity" argument that sex discrimination wastes human resources
is, with all its limitations, correct-and can be extended far
beyond the issue of employment. Second, the free reworking of
gender relations which are at present strongly constrained, and
psychological and cultural patterns at present strongly stylized,
geometrically increases the possibilities of experience 'and
invention. Hermaphroditism or androgyny is hardly even a
beginning. Third, and perhaps most important, the emotional
dimensions of life that are opened up for exploration in a
sexually equal society are more complex than those of our own
society because of the greater possibilities of creation and
diversity. Love between equals is no less passionate than love
under the star of gender inequality. It will be differently
passionate as the business of protection and dependence is
dispensed with. These themes in relationships will perhaps be
replaced by the excitement of the unknown and unpredictable,
and of constructing futures that are genuinely without pre-
ordained limits.1"
Valdes's counter-history effectively uses the values of modem
culture to undermine modem cultural practices. His use of Enlighten-
ment rationality and Romantic expressivism to analyze and reject
Euro-American hetero-patriarchy is forceful and persuasive precisely
because of its very rootedness in, as he puts it, "the vaunted ideals of
equality and liberty that this nation purports to embrace and
uphold.""' 7  In his vision of a radically unconstrained, liberated
sexuality unconnected to relations of power, as well as in his vision of
a rational culture able and willing to remake itself once its ideologies
are exposed as myths rather than the "natural, normal, and neces-
sary," Valdes paints an attractive picture of the world as we might
like it to be. It is a picture both derivative and subversive of Justice
White's official nationalism.
Yet his account, in holding modern culture fast to its own values,
also overlooks its limits. Here, the feminist example is instructive.
Feminists have been arguing ever since the Declaration of the Rights
of "Man" that women, too, have a claim on those God-given, natural,
105. id. at 210.
106. R.W. CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PERSON AND SEXUAL POLITICS
291 (1987).
107. Valdes, supra note 13, at 205.
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inalienable rights; and they have constructed their arguments using
the very tools of logic and rationality that the Enlightenment used
against despotism. Yet if it were reason alone that held women in
chains, those chains would have long ago burst asunder. Thus, the
example of feminism suggests that ignorance is not all there is at
stake. The problem is also one of power. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
puts it, "powerful people don't have to be acute or right."'"s
Sedgwick suggests that a calculated ignorance-a deliberate refusal to
know-is an instrument of power; and this in turn suggests that those
who benefit from Euro-American hetero-patriarchy may not simply
defer to Valdes' analysis. As all good lawyers know, the burden of
proof is key to the outcome of a case. As long as those who benefit
from hetero-patriarchy impose that burden on its challengers, Valdes'
painstaking effort to defeat the myths of Naturality, Normality,
Morality, and Utility may be met with simple denial.
So the deeper question here is about power. For even if we are
convinced by Valdes' demonstration that our sex/gender system is
"socially constructed," what happens next? Feminists have also
traditionally focused on the social construction argument, but it is not
clear why, as Sedgwick notes:
To the degree-and it is significantly large-that the gay
essentialist/constructivist debate takes its form and premises from,
and insistently refers to, a whole history of other nature/nurture
or nature/culture debates, it partakes of a tradition of viewing
culture as malleable relative to nature: that is, culture, unlike
nature, is assumed to be the thing that can be changed; the thing
in which "humanity" has, furthermore, a right or even an
obligation to intervene. This has certainly been the grounding of,
for instance, the feminist formulation of the sex/gender system
described above, whose implication is that the more fully gender
inequality can be shown to inhere in human culture rather than
in biological nature, the more amenable it must be to alteration
and reform. I remember the buoyant enthusiasm with which
feminist scholars used to greet the finding that one or another
brutal form of oppression was not biological but "only" cultural!
I have often wondered what the basis was for our optimism
about the malleability of culture by any one group or program.
At any rate, never so far as I know has there been a sufficiently
powerful place from which to argue that such manipulations,
however triumphal the ethical imperative behind them, were not
a right that belonged to anyone who might have the power to
perform them.1°9
108. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 7 (1990).
109. Id. at 41-42.
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Power does not give up without a fight. Particularly if our society
finds Euro-American hetero-patriarchy so useful to maintaining the
power of its elites, why would the law turn suddenly to protect even
subversive sexualities? If all societies we know of enlist sexuality in
the pursuit of cultural reproduction, why would ours suddenly stop?
Valdes' call for the legal protection of all sexualities for their own
sake seems overly optimistic.
There is a second, deeper problem of power at issue here: the
power of culture itself. Valdes, seeking the destruction of Euro-
American hetero-patriarchy through legal reform, places himself
within the venerable tradition of "legal normativity": that mode of
scholarship undertaken by "sovereign individual subjects who choose
their own discursive positions and thought processes and announce
these positions within a self-sufficient and weightless medium of com-
munication." ' This tradition, of course, is the Enlightenment
tradition of the subject that is both completely self-knowing and
possessed of the ability to remake itself. But there are doubts these
days about whether this tradition accurately represents our power
over ourselves, both as individuals and as a collective. In this critical
view, Euro-American hetero-patriarchy is not simply a set of ideas
that can be set aside if its holders agree to do so. It is a mode of life:
written into our bodies, our unconscious, our perceptions, our
relations of production as well as our relations of power."u In this
view, it is really revolution that Valdes is calling feminists and queers
to, not "reform;" and it is a revolution that forces us to turn ourselves
inside out, to try to abandon a way of seeing and thinking about the
world that is not external to us, but rather part of the fiber of our
being. If this is the case, then far more than the knowledge that
something is "socially constructed" is necessary for us to carry out this
revolution successfully.
Lastly, if it is correct that "social construction" cuts both ways-that
we are not only the constructors of our culture, but that we are in
turn constructed by it-then it becomes hard to imagine even
sexuality itself as Valdes seems to imagine it, free of any social
"regulation." As Judith Butler puts it:
[S]exuality cannot be summarily made or unmade, and it would
be a mistake to associate "constructivism" with "the freedom of
a subject to form his/her sexuality as s/he pleases." A construc-
110. Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801,892 (1991).
This language, of course, is common to all types of "liberal," or "modernist," critique based on
the notion that oppression results from ignorance and that education will consequently lead to
liberation. For a careful analysis, criticism, and defense of this kind of critique, see generally
FAY, supra note 22.
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tion is, after all, not the same as an artifice. On the contrary,
constructivism needs to take account of the domain of constraints
without which a certain living and desiring being cannot make its
way. And every such being is constrained by not only what is
difficult to imagine, but what remains radically unthinkable: in
the domain of sexuality these constraints include the radical un-
thinkability of desiring otherwise, the radical unendurability of
desiring otherwise, the absence of certain desires, the repetitive
compulsion of others, the abiding repudiation of some sexual
possibilities, panic, obsessional pull, and the nexus of sexuality
and pain."2
Butler asks, "[H]ow do we pursue the question of sexuality and the
law, where the law is not only that which represses sexuality, but a
prohibition that generates sexuality or, at least, compels its direc-
tionality?"" 3 Thus, whereas Valdes sees social and state power as
only repressive, squashing a natural and independent desire and
sexuality, Butler suggests that law-power, taboos, prohibitions-is
also somehow productive of sexuality itself. In this view, to try to
remove relations of power from sexuality is futile: Sexuality is a
creature of power, perhaps even domination. The task, then, would
not be to "free" sexuality from regulation, but to seek to alter the
forms of that regulation, and to reduce the systematic damage that
our forms of regulation inflict upon certain groups; not to pursue a
negative liberty that will at last leave the subject free to desire in a
vacuum absent all constraint, but a positive liberty that seeks to
subject all its necessary prohibitions to critical scrutiny.
IV
I have described the source of trouble in each article in this
symposium as a "seduction" by modern culture. Morris is seduced by
the notion of one nation indivisible, bound by consent rather than
coercion. Valdes risks being seduced by the promise of absolute
liberty: to celebrate a sexuality free of instrumentalism, and to
change the sex/gender system by an act of will. Viewed in a larger
context, however, modern culture is not their enemy but their friend.
Both articles work effectively within the modem political tradition of
opening up for public debate practices and values formerly taken for
granted, even unarticulated.
Conservatives like to imagine that gay and lesbian activists, like
feminists and antiracist people of color, simply wish to discover and
112. JUDIH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMIS OF "SEX" 94
(1993).
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cling to prefabricated "identities" determined by victim status and/or
genetics. But both articles in this Symposium show something quite
different at work. Morris and Valdes open up to critical scrutiny
some of the dominant narratives that tell us in modern society who
"we" are. In the process, they force us to be conscious of those
narratives-to defend or attack them, but no longer to unthinkingly
live by them. Far from cherishing preexisting identities, Morris and
Valdes seek to make new identities possible by placing the old ones
in an unfamiliar and disturbing light.
The sociologist Bennett Berger argues that this trend toward
increasing critical public scrutiny of practices formerly considered
noncontroversial or nonpolitical is a characteristic feature of large,
liberal democratic societies. The clash of different ways of life-what
Bennett calls "subcultures"-forces a new self-consciousness about
one's own culture; and even when dominant practices and ideologies
remain dominant, the very fact that they have had to be articulated
and defended alters them irrevocably.
[O]ne of the consequences of conflict between subcultures is that
the assumptions that render routine social practices as "cultural"
[by which Berger means "unquestioned"] elements of dignified
and meaningful ways of life get revealed. And once revealed,
they become arguable. When that happens, some of the
relationships between conventional culture and the status or
power of social groups is also revealed .... The genie is out of
the bottle; Pandora's box is open; Humpty Dumpty falls off the
wall.... What was but no longer is taken for granted can never
again be blithely assumed. Rather, "backlashes" and other
efforts to restore the authority of traditional "mainstream"
culture or some status quo ante must be argued for."1
From this perspective, Morris' attack on Justice White's official
nationalism is flawed primarily by Morris' failure to be sufficiently
self-conscious. Morris is right to bring the assumption that "Our
Nation" is monocultural into critical scrutiny, to show how Justice
White's account of American culture suppresses Hawaiian traditions.
His error is in failing to recognize the full implications of his own
analysis: the risk his counter-narrative runs of performing that
suppression yet again. In contrast, Valdes' strategy is both simple and
devastating. To gather formerly unconsidered practices together, to
show them to be systematically connected, and to give them a
name-"Euro-American hetero-patriarchy"-is already to disrupt the
status quo. Yet Valdes goes even further, not only giving this system
114. BENNETT M. BERGER, AN ESSAY ON CULTURE: SYMBOLIC STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 34-35 (1995).
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a name but its own history. In so doing, Valdes does not, as I have
pointed out, ensure that the system will fall. But to force us into self-
consciousness about the sexual practices we are used to thinking of as
natural, normal, or necessary is already to achieve a subtle victory.
Taking this wider view, then, both articles work with, rather than
against, modernity. The modern society we live in is one in which not
only "the personal" is political, but also practices and values of every
sort. The conservative response to these trends is to decry "political
correctness," to fear the loss of a common culture, and to mourn the
good old days of hegemony. But the clock is unlikely to turn back.
And the United States, after all, was founded not only on the unques-
tioned domination of eighteenth-century Anglo-Saxon culture over all
others, but also on the dream of liberal democracy: a society built on
tolerance, open debate, and even social struggle. The best hope of
liberalism remains the hope that this commitment to critique can itself
form the core of a common culture. As Berger puts it:
What holds us together, then, may in retrospect be a common
culture, but if so, it is a common culture forged in a here and
now by the bargains we have struck, the compromises we have
achieved, and, where we have failed, by the demonstrations we
have mounted, the social movements we have spawned, the wars
we have fought, the victories we have won, the defeats we have
suffered, and even, perhaps, the corruptions we are left with.1 15
115. Id. at 52-53.
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